We are building a new world, a new republic, and for this purpose we need new people. This is not easy. It is far easier to supply new techniques or new weapons than new brains.

Zdenek Nejedly, Czecholslovak Minister of Education, 1952

The artist is the engineer of the human soul.

I.V. Stalin

Maybe Socialist artists stood a chance to engineer the “new man” necessary for the everlasting success of communism if they would have not faced the constant bombardment of appealing music from the West. First jazz threatened to “poison the consciousness of the masses” as Andrei A. Zhdanov, Stalin’s chief architect for new man, claimed. Similarly, Beattlemania spread “faster than the epidemic of the Asian flu” across the Eastern Block and changed the sound of Eastern Block music forever. Later, Iron Maiden’s 1984 “World Slavery Tour” freed Polish youth as the authorities failed to react when the fans unveiled Solidarity banners during the concerts (Ryback, p.180). Such outside influences could only work against the creation of the new man for they espoused individualism, freedom, and nonconformism, values directly contradictory to those worthy of a communist society. These intrinsic qualities made music politically valuable and this is why communist ideologues tried to eradicate jazz and rock from their lands and instead replace them with carefully crafted ideologically appropriate music. And when such efforts flopped, the communist regimes either sought to incorporate favorable political messages into rock or jazz, or liberalized the music scene in order to prevent domestic music from turning overtly political and to provide a politically safe avenue for the opposition to channel the discontent arising from failed economic policies. For the “engineers of human soul,” music was just another political weapon to be wielded accordingly.

On the surface, picking an ideological fight over music seems petty and politically counterproductive as it risks antagonizing youth, a significant demographic category of the post-war Eastern European population — nobody likes surrendering control to the state of something as personal as musical preference. In the context of the tense moments of the early Cold War, such a battle might have seem worth fighting. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, strategists viewed music as a potentially effective way to undermine each other’s ideology and dedication. For example, an East German general argued that American music served as preparation for war as it eroded the troops’ will to fight (p. 12). At the same time, NATO military journals boasted the importance of music for demoralizing enemy troops and populations (p.18). Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations considered “psychological warfare” through propaganda to be an effective way of eventually breaking up the Soviet empire and consequently, they directed radio Voice of America to subvert communist ideology within the Warsaw pact countries through music and news programming (Hixson, p.58). The Soviet and Eastern European leadership reacted by not only jamming Western radio broadcasts but also by waging their own war domestically.

Western music such as jazz and rock threatened communist regimes in two ways. First, it was American, and thus its popularity offered the United States a propaganda victory in the Cold War. Second, and more importantly, jazz and rock offered their listeners a taste of freedom, individualism, and nonconformism — a dangerous experience for any person that was to voluntarily give up self-interest and become the ideal selfless socialist man wholly dedicated to his or her community. Freedom entailed the ability for one to chose where to live, what to study, where to work, and what to think. Such abilities could cripple the state’s ability to achieve prosperity and maximal equality through a centrally planned economy. Additionally, freedom implicitly granted the individual the right to “freedom from communism” which went contrary to the Marxist-Leninist theoretical requirement for a “dictatorship of the proletariat” to establish communism. Individualism meant that one’s personal wishes lied above the community’s needs; nonconformism allowed someone to be different and therefore not equal to their peers. Consequently, to consolidate communism by creating the selfless new man, it was necessary to discredit freedom, individualism, and nonconformism in the eyes of the future new man. And if jazz and rock were to promote such ideas, then, jazz and rock were to be eradicated. While jazz and rock did not necessarily seek to exude ideologically toxic messages, through their musical definition, they inadvertently did.

Take jazz for example. Jazz is an improvisational and soloist-oriented genre whose music often defies classical theoretical conventions. To play a jazz tune, the musicians agree on a common theme, structure, and the order in which they trade solos. Within this framework, the jazz musician is free to play anything. Moreover, jazz music often disregards traditional harmonies and is instead constructed on relatively more dissonant 7^th chords, often cycled in a tense II-V-I cadence (Rawlins and Bahha, p.11-13). Melodically, not only do jazz soloists frequently employ colorful scales such as the harmonic and melodic minor scales and their exotic modes, but they also  parse their solos with chromatic passing tones — notes that do not belong to the key in which the song is played in (Spitzer, p.30). These musical features project a world view inherently closer to democratic capitalism than to communism. The liberal song structures of jazz, as well as its wilder melodic traits, reflect unabridged liberty; the solo-centered nature of many jazz pieces implies the importance of the uniqueness of the individual; the dissonance of its harmonic structured as well as the use of chromatic passing tones and of exotic scales suggest nonconforism with the accepted status-quo.

To the horror of the communist ideological watchdogs, jazz seemed to have functioned as a persuasive advocate for anti-communist values. After the end of WWII, despite censorship, jazz reemerged strongly in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and in the Soviet Union’s major cities such as  Moscow and Leningrad (Ryback, p.13-14). Furthermore, many jazz enthusiasts appeared to have perceived jazz as the music of freedom and as an anti-thesis to communism. Dave Brubeck, after returning from State Department sponsored world tour declared to the New York Times that a frequent toast he often heard at jazz parties in Poland intoned: “…now that you have been with us this long . . . perhaps you will take back with you the knowledge that we Poles love freedom as much as you Americans. (Crist, p.158).”

Soon after, though, rock, and later punk-rock and heavy metal, dwarfed jazz as an ideological threat to communism. In 1954, Bill Haley’s “Rock Around the Clock” stormed the Eastern Block and redefined how the youth dressed, acted, and danced (Ryback, p.20) and ten years later, The Beatles overpowered Eastern Block audiences (p.51). If the two events weren’t already enough for the communist cultural warriors, in the late 70s, in Hungary, Poland, and to an extent in the Soviet Union, punk rockers challenged all the accepted aesthetic, moral, and cultural norms (p. 167, 181, 214). Three factors made the rock and punk rock issues especially problematic. First, the music was extremely popular and inspired the creation of local scenes (p.56). Second, like jazz, the music disseminated anti-communistic values, but, more importantly, it made such values easier to comprehend for the audiences. And third, in the case of punk-rock, it found fertile socio-economic conditions for acquiring a lasting and politically significant fan base (p. 171).

Rock and punk-rock boasted aggressive rhythms, distorted guitar sounds laden with unconventional effects, lyrics that either were politically charged or dealt with social taboos such as love, sex, or open protest (p.34). In the case of punk-rock, the music even ceased being melodic as the guitars repeated the same two or three riffs throughout the song while the vocalists screamed obscenities (p174). The aggressive rhythms and the distorted songs as well as the often frank lyrics of rock portrayed the music so many Eastern Europeans loved as a byproduct of freedom. Similarly, the complete disregard for the audience and for the censors of the music’s  lyrics and vocals conveyed through their vulgarity and dissonance, highlighted the artists’ ambivalence towards the group and, hence, their emphasis on individualism as well as on their nonconformism. More importantly, the messages suggested by these musical traits were easier for the listener to grasp than those suggested by jazz — a distorted guitar and a scream cannot be hidden in the liberal, though complex, structure and sound of jazz.

The authorities’ response soon followed. The cultural apparatchiks, at first, adopted a strategy seeking to completely eliminate jazz and rock and thus focused on banning and discrediting the new genres. Since 1946 up till Stalin’s death in 1953, jazz and rock were officially forbidden on the airwaves, in clubs, or in private. Musicians had their instruments confiscated, and those who caused problems for the communist government were deported to Siberia (p11-15). Although after Stalin’s death official controls were eased, jazz and rock tunes rarely got played on the radio and were never recorded on the state’s label (p.17). Simultaneously, Eastern Block newspapers blasted the new music genres. For example, in 1952, Contemporanul, a Romanian daily, begged the censors to “rid our music of the influence of the hysterical and cacophonous American jazz, (Ryback, p. 17)” while in 1956, Sovietskaia Muzyka, in response to the growing popularity of rock, urged officials “not to let rubbish instead of pure water through the sluices that have been opened (p. 35).”

To replace the perceived dangerous influences, cultural functionaries sought to create and promote adequate music that espoused communist values. Such music was intended to be perfectly formal and not break any accepted theoretical musical convention — for symphonic composers, the use of chromatic passing tones and of counterpoint were strictly forbidden and enforced by the censors at least in the Soviet Union and Romania (Frolova-Walker, p.103, 105). Paradoxically, Romanian cultural officials urged Romanian composers to find new and appealing ways to promote communism (Crotty, p.9). The result of this campaign by Romanian authorities produced several flops like Sabin Drǎgoi’s symphonic poem “In Memory of a Woman-Comrade Who Fell in the Underground Struggle.”

When this strategy to cleanse the Eastern Block of ideologically unsound music failed, officials tried to then exploit rock music’s popularity to their own political advantage. In Romania the regime offered musicians access to state studios, provided them with high-end Western equipment, and creative freedom if they agreed to not criticize the regime, promote certain political messages, and preserve a certain degree of formality in their behavior on stage (Ryback, p. 127). The most successful Romanian rock band of the late 60s and early 70s, The Phoenix started as a The Beatles inspired act with politically neutral lyrics that profited from the cultural thaw of the early Ceausescu regime. However, as a result of a brief crackdown of the authorities after the audience got out of hand at a concert in Timisoara in 1969, the band negotiated its reemergence by offering to adopt a nationalistic tone. Its subsequent two albums drew strong influences from Romanian folk music and sung about traditional Romanian myths as well as about the feats of popular heroes who resisted Ottoman invasions in the Middle Ages. Another example of the Romanian authorities’ attempt to use jazz and rock music for political gain is Cenaclul Flacara, a regular forum that assembled Romania’s most famous musicians to sing patriotic songs or praises to Lenin and Ceausescu (Ryback, p. 127). This embrace of jazz and rock music served the regime politically two-fold. First, this relative liberalization of the ideologically unsound music promoted both abroad and domestically Romania’s image a maverick of the Soviet block that asserted that each socialist country is to find its own path to communism independent of Moscow’s orders. At this time, the Brezhnev regime maintained a fairly tight grip on jazz and rock in the Soviet Union. Second, as a result of this bargain with the youth music scene, rock music started offering the regime public support, thus alleviating concerns regarding the ideological salience of the instrumentation itself.

Meanwhile, Hungary’s strategy centered on preventing the development of overtly critical music by winning the hearts of the musicians by liberalizing both the music scene and the music market. Jazz artists were allowed to perform anywhere in Budapest, including on the streets, without restriction (Byback, p. 85). Rock bands like Locomotiv GT and Beatrice not only enjoyed artistic freedom but also enjoyed economic freedom — they were allowed to retain most of the profits from selling records and touring and were also allowed to tour abroad. Such liberties were unprecedented for an Eastern Block country and earned Janos Kadar’s regime the musicians’ goodwill which insulated the regime from open criticism from mainstream bands (Ryback, p. 169). This freedom also allowed the development of a thriving rock scene from which superstars emerged and overshadowed and kept the dangerous punk bands out of the spotlight. For example, Coitus Punk Group, a hardcore punk band that delivered withering criticism both to the Kadar regime as well as to the Soviet Union’s foreign policy was not banned until the lead singer tore apart a live chicken on stage (p. 178). By allowing the band to discredit itself in such a manner, the regime allowed the band to legitimize the regime’s claim that hardcore punk was only music for hooligans.

Another example of a tolerant attitude towards jazz and rock music was, surprisingly, Poland’s Jaruzelski regime, a military dictatorship. As soon as General Jaruzelski took power in late 1981, he instated martial law and cracked down on the Solidarity movement as the government did not have the economic resources to either address the demands of the protesters nor the ability to carry meaningful reforms without risking a Soviet military intervention in the style of Prague Spring a decade and a half earlier (Kalisky, p. 127). In order to win over Poland’s youth — or at least keep them off the streets — Jaruzelski eased censorship on rock and punk  rock music (Ryback, p. 183). This way, Jaruzelski offered Polish youth with a distraction from the day-to-day economic struggles and with a means to channel their frustration that did not risk sparking street fighting and a revolution.

Throughout the Cold War, Eastern Block communist regimes treated music as merely a means to a political end. In a restrictive society, music gained political value by conveying the audience emotions and values that its members could not experience by interacting within society as a result of the political status-quo. As communist idealists tried to establish  formal, collectivist, and uniform societies, they sought to eradicate anything that would convey the opposing values of freedom, individualism, and nonconformism. This is why they initially cracked down on jazz and rock. And when these genres, despite the harshest efforts of the authorities, became institutionalized even into communist societies, the regimes tried to protect themselves by infusing their own talking points into rock music as it was in the case in Romania, or by manifesting good will towards the artists through musical liberalization as it was the case in Hungary and Poland. Neither the initial censorship strategy nor the eventual relaxation succeeded in creating new republics inhabited by the ideal selfless socialist new man; communism and totalitarian regimes are now gone from the face of Europe. Perhaps the artist is not “the engineer of human soul,” but just an entertainer trying to live making music freely.

Asa ca ii invit pe PNListi sa termine cu ipocrizia si sa ia o carte de macroeconomie sau de doctrina liberala. Nu inteleg de ce PNL se plange ca bugetarii sunt concediati si ca subventiile sunt reduse si ca salariile bugetariilor sunt readuse inapoi la pretul pietei. Parca liberalismul clasic spunea ca statul trebuie sa fie minimal — deci cu putini angajati. Si ca piata libera trebuie sa decida cum resursele sunt alocate in societate — deci statul nu trebuie sa mentina artificial salarii in sectorul sau si ca subventiile trebuie eliminate complet.

Realizez ca aceste masuri de austeritate au un cost social si uman enorm. Este trist ca a trebuit sa se ajunga aici. Basescu si Boc isi au vina lor, la fel ca si Tariceanu si PSDul, si ca tot romanul de rand care propaga o cultura a lenii si a coruptiei care duc la o dezvoltare economica ineficienta. Tocmai ce am trecut pe autostrada Soarelui: doi oameni munceau, zece stateau la tigari si vorba — ei fumau si vorbeau pe banii nostrii si pe banii viitoriilor concediati.

Asa ca ce sa facem pentru a trece de criza. Eu propun un plan simplu si liberal.

Pe termen scurt propun:

• reducerea subventiilor asa cum propun Basescu si Boc
• reducerea salariilor in mod progresiv in mod temporar, cu achitarea baniilor reduci acum in 3 ani, astfel omul de rand are acoperire sa traiasca pe credit zilele astea.
• concediu neplatit si concedieri in aparatul bugetar asa cum propun Basescu si BNR.
• instaurarea taxelor pe mosteniriile mari (mai mari de 400.000 Euro sa zicem)

Pe termen lung propun:

• reducerea semnificativa a birocratiei. Acest lucru trebuie facut nu numai prin reduceri de personal si de institutii, ci si prin reducerea scoupului birocratiei prin dereglementare si liberalizarea pietelor si a statului. Eliminarea necesitatii notariilor publici ar fi o idee de considerat pentru ca acestia adauga costuri enorme pentru populatiei si mediu de afaceri.
• eliminarea graduala a subventiilor in orice sistem si privatizarea tuturor intreprinderiilor de stat in afara de cele cu importanta strategica in aparare, dar acestea sunt putine…
• privatizarea sistemului de educatie si sanitar pe sisteme de tichete si subventii pentru cei mai saraci.
• reducerea taxelor pentru a evita evaziunea fiscala + amnistia fiscala in anumite cazuri.
• schimbarea culturii de coruptie si de furtisag care o duce la propagarea evaziunii fiscale si a ineficientei. O sa scriu un post mai indelungat numai despre aceste lucruri in curand.
• schimbarea structurii de taxare. Impozite pe venit, capital, profit mai mici. Mentinerea TVA pe la vreo 10-15% pentru a incuraja investiile si nu consumul pe termen mediu. Impozitare pigoviana pentru a descuraja consumul de lucruri daunatoare si pentru a mulge bani din pacatele oameniilor — taxarea tutunului, alcoolului, marijuanei, casinourilor, benzinei si motorinei cu discount pentru intreprinderiile mici si mijlocii.

Dar ca sa putem implementa aceste solutii, trebuie sa renuntam la ipocrizie in cazul PNL, la setea de puterea incontrolabila a lui Basescu & Co, la iresponsabilitatea populista a PSD. Trebuie sa ne asumam situatia in care suntem, si sa o rezolvam, indiferent de costuri. Daca nu actionam acum, costuriile vor fi mult mai mari in viitor. Si nu ma refer la ecuatii aritmetice, ci la vieti si generatii distruse de o depresie economica. Si daca nu actionam si ne reformam pe termen lung, o sa ne mai regasim cu optiuniile triste cu care ne confruntam astazi.

Pacifistii isi bazeaza argumentul pe urmatoarele doua premize: ca nimeni nu are de ce sa ne atace si ca beneficiem de securitate ieftina fiind aliati SUA cu baze SUA pe teritoriu, scut anti-racheta, etc. Accept faptul ca in absenta unei greseli strategice majore nu o sa ne atace nimeni in urmatorii 30 de ani. Dar pentru ca securitatea noastra este garantata ACUM de absenta unei amenintari (exagerez, Rusia este o amenintare pentru ca inca considera ca o zona tampon cu vestul ii este necesara pentru propria securitate) si de umbrela unui hegemon (SUA, via NATO), nu inseamna ca strategia pacifistiilor este o idee buna. Daca nu ne modernizam armata si aviatia militara suntem de facto “free riders” (in traducere libera, calatori fara bilet) pe puterea SUA. Iar un precedent de “free riding” submineaza viabilitatea unei aliante in absenta hegemonului in doua moduri. In primul rand, free riding al unui actor incurajeaza raspandirea free riding  — “daca voi Romanii va bagati bani in economie sa traiti bine, noi-tara-NATO-alta-decat-SUA-sau-UK de ce sa nu facem la fel, doar voi romanii aveti securitate moca de la Americani.” Raspandirea free riding expune alianta unei situatii in care daca SUA isi va pierde puterea relativa, nimeni din alianta nu va mai beneficia de securitate. In al doilea rand, free-riding antagonizeaza SUA, cel mai important aliat strategic al Romaniei si al Europei de Est. In absenta unei armate rezonabil de puternice in proportie cu capacitatea unei tarii, Romania nu poate contribui la securitatea colectiva a aliantei, punand propriile sarcini in carca SUA care este acum preocupata de cresterea puterea Chinei, Indiei, Braziliei, si de prevenirea unui eventual scandal in Korea dupa moartea lui Kim Jong Il. Joe Biden a transmis foarte clar acest mesaj Romaniei la Bucuresti cand a spus ca este timpul ca statele Est Europene sa devina garantorii de securitate.

Extrema razboiniciilor se bazeaza pe o goana irationala dupa mandrie nationala sau ambitii de mare putere. In primul rand, cumpararea de 52 de avioane noi F-16 sau mai scump de Eurofighter Typhoon ar arunca deficitul bugetar in aer sau ar cere cresteri de taxe sau reduceri drastice de cheltuieli, ambele lucruri ce ar pune in pericol revenirea economica. In al doilea rand, desi o astfel de achiztie ar oferi Romaniei pe deplin statul de garantor de securitate, o astfel de achizitie in astfel de conditii economice ar trimite veciniilor Romaniei un mesaj foarte prost in legatura de intentiile Romaniei. F-16 Block 52+ sau 52 de bucatii de Eurofighter Typhoon reprezinta o capacitate exagerata pentru nevoiile Romaniei (suveranitate aeriana, securitatea la Marea Neagra, o misiune expeditionara NATO din cand in cand). Vecinii Romaniei realizeaza discrepanta dintre nevoiile Romaniei si capabilitatiile tocmai cumparata — care este mai mare decat capabilitatea combinata a Bulgariei, Serbiei, Ungariei, Cehiei, si Slovaciei. In acest context, acestia isi vor pune intrebari in legatura cu intentiile Romaniei — doar nu cumparam avioane de decor in plin de recesiune. Astfel de comportament din partea Romaniei submineaza increderea intre Romaniei si tariile din jur, o situatie total nefericita pentru relatiile internationale ale Romaniei.

Pentru a vedea acest lucru, imaginati-va ca sunteti Vladimir Putin si Romania tocmai ce a achizitionat avioane capabile sa elimine flota ruseasca la Marea Neagra dintr-o lovitura si sa aiba in acelasi timp o forta reziduala suficienta pentru dominatie aeriana deasupra propriului teritoritu. Chiar daca in eventualitatea unui conflict, Rusia ar invinge in lupa aeriana si navala dupa o saptamana sau doua, ar invinge cu pierderi mari si si-ar pierde mitul puterii daca apare un headline pe prima pagina a unui ziar international: “Romania [country nobody heard of] shoots down dozens of Russian front line fighters.” Aceasta realitate de care Rusia este constienta ar servi Romaniei ca un deterent impotriva oricarui conflict armat cu Rusia. Dar din perspectiva Rusiei, Romania nu are nevoie de un astfel de deterent — doar are garantii NATO si forte Americane pe teritoriu — si deci singurul motiv pentru care Romania ar face o astfel de achiztiei este pentru a isi asigura securitatea in cazul in care Romania vrea sa se comporte mai agresiv in zona regionala (implicare prin Moldova, Transnistria). Un astfel de comportament al Romaniei ar fi impotriva interesului rus de a proiecta putere pana la granitele NATO adica inclusiv in Moldova si Transnistria. Deci singa optiune rationala pentru Rusia ramane a preveni Romania in a achiziona o astfel de capabilitate sau, daca este prea tarziu, pentru a interveni undeva inaintea Romaniei. Pe scurt, comportament mai agresiv la adresa Romaniei si a Moldovei. Adica o durere de cap. Acesta ar fi echivalentul diplomatic al unui “preventive strike” inainte de a achiztie sau de “preemptive strike” dupa achiztie.

Solutia aleasa de Basescu, 24 de avioane F-16 second hand este ideala in situatia de fata. Aceste avioane combinate cu piloti bine pregatiti de US Air Force ofera Romaniei un deterent impotriva Rusiei fara a trage semnale de alarma. 24 de F-16 ofera Romaniei capabilitatea strict de a isi aparara spatiul aerian, dar nu si de a contraataca, si deci de a umili Rusia. Mai mult, 24 de F-16 ofera Romaniei posibilitatea sa contribuie la misiuniile internationale ale NATO sau la apararea unor tari vecine in viitor. Si cel mai important, pentru ca F-16 sunt cumparate de la Americani si sunt cumparate cu promisiunea de a mai cumpara in viitor, acestea aduc Romaniei posibilitatea de a cumpara in viitor F-35.

Sper ca Parlamentul sa nu obstructioneze aceasta achizitie dupa cum zvonuriile pe internet sugereaza ca ar fi posibil. Dupa cum am aratat, alternativele nu sunt niste politici viabile. Sper ca PNL si PSD sa nu se joace de a politica cu securitatea Romaniei.

• De ce tensiuniile intre presedintele Afghan Hamid Karzai si administratia Obama sunt favorabile SUA.
• Change Comes, Through The Same Old Ways (un articol despre strategiile politice din America si reforma din sanatate a lui Barack Obama)
• Despre o ipocrizie a stangii Americane.
• The Fair Struggle
• Razboiul Electronic Poate Sterge America de pe Harta
• Cum Cuvintele Creaza Teroristi

Pentru a preveni alte incidente in care tarile traversate de conductele rusesti sufera, Gazprom a propus doua proiecte. Primul si cel mai putin amenintator este South Stream, care consta in amplasarea unei conductei sub Marea Neagra pana in Bulgaria, de unde aceasta s-ar indrepta spre vestul Europei. South Stream da Kremlinului posibilitatea de a inchide gazul Ucrainei si Romaniei fara a deranja vesticii. Cel mai periculos dintre proiecte, Nord Stram, ar uni Rusia si Germania pe sub Marea Baltica, ocolind astfel Estonia, Lithuania, Letonia, Polonia si sud-estul Europei. Dincolo de pericolele ecologice pe care le ridica amplasarea unei conducte de gaz intr-o mare inca impanzita de mine din cel de-al doilea Razboi Mondial, Nord Stream ameninta sa submineze securitatea europeana nu numai prin faptul ca permite Gazprom-ului sa dicteze preturile pe continent, dar, ofera Rusiei abilitatea de a santaja energetic Europa occidentala. Mai mult, acceptarea Nord Stream de catre Europa de Vest, poate declansa o furtuna politica ce ar cuprinde intreaga Uniune Europeana pentru ca ar alimenta Euro scepticismul est European deoarece gestul vesticiilor ar fi perceput ca drept o tradare a securitatii esticiilor in schimbul comfortului vesticiilor.

Aceste scenarii apocalitice pot fi prevenite daca Europa se uneste in spatele unei strategii de diversificare a resurselor energetice. In primul rand, Europa are nevoie sa construiasca conducta Nabucco care ar conecta resusele din Azerbaijan, Iran si Iraq  cu consumatorii Europeni. Cu toate acestea, proiectul Nabucco isi are partile lui problematice. Aproape o treime din gazul in discutie se afla in Azerbaijan, un stat care se teme de o invazie similara cu cea suferita de Georgia in 2008. Pentru a preveni un astfel de eveniment, Europa trebuie sa dea asigurari Azerbaijanului in ceea ce priveste siguranta lui fara a provoca o reactie puternica din partea Rusiei. Acordarea statutului de membru NATO Azerbaijanului, de exemplu, ar legitimiza o interventie militara rusa. In schimb, Europa ar trebui sa faca doua lucruri: sa isi consolodeze relatiile diplomatice si economice cu Azerbaijanul astfel incat costul politic al unei interventii ruse sa fie exorbitant, si, sa inceapa exploatarea gazului din Iran si Iraq pentru a minimiza castiguriile geopolitice ale Rusiei in cazul unei inteventii in Azerbaijan. In sfrsit, Europa ar trebui sa investeasca in resurse alternative cum ar fi energia eoliana, hidroelectrica si nucleara.

Daca Europa isi largeste spectrul resurselor energetice, UE va reusi sa sparga monopolul Gazprom. Astfel Europa ar obtine beneficiile economice ale unei piete energetice competitive, si s-ar si asigura ca nu va mai ramane niciodata fara caldura sau apa calda. Dar, pana cand leaderii europeni se vor uni in spatele acestei politici energetice, popoarele lor vor trece iarna ridicand paharul in cinstea gazului rusesc, dupa cum melodia promotionala a Gazprom ii sfatuieste.

Prima data cand m-am comfruntat cu ‘Ai auzit ca in Romania…’ a fost pe la inceputul liceului cand a ajuns vorba si in America ca un grup de olteni de la tara au dezgropat un mort, i-au fiert inima si apoi au bagat un tarus in locul inimii inainte sa reingroape cadavrul, aceste actiuni find motivate de dorinta sateniilor de a scapa de strigoiul ce ii bantuiau. Presa romana, in goana ei neastamparata de senzational, a promovat subiectul timp de cateva zile, timp suficient pentru ca presa straina sa raporteze barbarismul neobisnuit al romaniilor.

Acum cateva zile am auzit de la cativa colegi americanii o alta stire din Romania la fel de ingrozitoare: faptul ca in Romania se dezbate folosirea flacarii violet in scopuri electorale. Inspaimantator nu a fost faptul ca niste colegi au glumit cu mine ci faptul ca acestia au descoperit acest fapt aparent divers in cotidianul The New York Times, un ziar cu zeci de milioane de cititori. Oare ce imagine ar fi avut acesti oameni despre Romania daca nu ar fi cunoscut grupul de studenti romani din universitate? Insa, oare ce parere si-au facut despre Romania celelalte zeci de milioane de americani care nu au cunoscut vreun student roman? Oare ce parere isi face senatorul american care citeste zilnic The New York Times despre tara asupra careia va trebui sa aprobe vanzarea de avioane multirole sau ridicarea vizelor pentru tranzitul cetateniilor sai? Oare ce va crede diplomatul american despre niste parteneri de dialog romani care se ocupa cu razboaie para-psihologico-spirituale? Voi in locul acestor decidenti americani ce ati crede despre Romania vazuta astfel? Daca ati raspunde la aceste intrebari cu sinceritate usturatoare veti descoperi de ce tremur de fiecare data cand aud propozitia: ‘Ai auzit ca in Romania…?’

Se poate spune ca de la politicienii nostri nu ne putem astepta la mai mult. Chiar daca acceptam faptul ca Mircea Geoana este un prostanac, acest lucru nu absolva presa pentru perpetuarea temei ezoterice la nesfarsit. Presa trebuie sa constientizeze ca ceea ce publica are un impact mai mare decat buzunarul patronului sau niste sondaje trecatoare. Ceea ce este scris in presa autohtona poate fi preluat si afara, iar ceea ce este preluat afara ne machiaza chipul cu care ne prezentam in lume, fie cel individual, fie cel national. Iar presa are responsabilitatea ca, fara a ingropa gunoiul sub pres, sa ajute la crearea unei imagini pozitive a tarii in lume. Iar presa poate indeplini acest obiectiv renuntand la discutia eterna pe subiecte tabloide jenante pentru propria tara.

Daca Mircea Geoana si Viorel Hrebenciuc vor sa se prezinte ca niste prostanaci, atunci sunt liberi sa o faca. Insa sa nu o faca pe seama mea sau a romanului care isi reprezinta tara cu demnitate in Afghanistan pentru ca fiecare cetatean are dreptul la o imagine publica proprie — o imagine care sa nu reflecte petele altora, nici chiar ale lui Geoana sau Hrebenciuc. Iar cand Geoana si Hrebenciuc ne incalca acest drept in scopuri politice, presa ii poate responsabiliza. Cum? Ei trebuie simplu ignorati din cand in cand, chiar si atunci cand acestia aduc ratinguri astronomice prin prostia lor.

P.S.

Stiu ca nu v-am scris de mult, insa am inceput un nou semestru cu niste cursuri mai grele unde trebuie sa invat si sa scriu de sparg. Sper ca o duceti cu totii bine si ca nu v-a infectat flacara violet.

Pastrarea si definirea identitatii politice de dreapta a PNL este sinonima cu redresarea primei greseli din 2009 — lipsa unei imagini clare pentru Crin si neinsusirea unor teme de dezbatere politica la care electoratul sa se gandeasca automat cand aude ‘Crin’ sau ‘PNL.’ Care ar fi aceste teme si cum ar putea fi ele asumate?

Prima si cea mai potenta tema este ordinea in tara — respect fata de lege, combaterea criminalitatii, combaterea coruptiei, combaterea cocalarismului. Tema ordinii este potenta din trei motive. In primul rand, aceasta este foarte vizibila oameniilor de rand. Stiriile de la ora cinci domina ratinguriile si simboluriile dezordinii sunt prezente la orice colt — ‘aia’ care vin la tine in centrul Constantei sa iti vanda un telefon ciordit, politaii care se holbeaza ca prostii la taximetrisii parcati in intersectii, porcii si vaciile din parlament si din guverne care s-au abonat la fotoliile caldute si la banii europeni. In al doilea rand, ordinea este o tema vitala pentru oameni, la fel ca si economia. Nimeni nu vrea sa traiasca intr-o tara in care sa le fie frica sa iasa din case seara sau sa se duca la un schimb valutar sau la o banca sau sa se suie in tren. Reamniti-va cate jafuri si deraieri au fost in 2009. Tema ordinii,deci, poate fi folosita in a speria si inspira electoratul. Adica poate fi folosita in a scoate lumea la vot pe fond emotional. Si in ultimul rand, tema ordinii nu a fost asumata de nici un partid important si, mai important, se poate cladi, chiar si in mod liberal, pe preconceptiile foarte multor romani. Nu de putine ori am auzit cliseul: ‘In Romania numai de o mana de fier care sa faca ordine.’ Pentru cei care cred fraza precedenta, un discurs apasat a lui Crin in care acesta sa enunte ca vrea sa vina sa faca ordine si sa curete Romania iar unge pe acestia la inimioara. Iar un astfel de discurs nu ar aliena electoratul liberal si mai educat pentru ca dincolo de soundbites, intr-un discurs pot fi introduse nuante si explicatii. O astfel de nuanta ar fi renuntarea la legiile aberant de restrictive care invita in a fi incalcate, in schimbul, unor legi mai permisive care sa largeasca libertatiile invidivuale, dar care sa fie aplicate mult mai sever. In engelza, ‘more enforcement for more liberty.’

A doua tema este, in lipsa unei definitii mai bune, populismul antreprenorial. Prin populism antreprenorial sugerez pe de o parte o atitudine pro-business cu accent in discurs si in actiunea parlamentara pe partea de small-business — afaceri de familie gen shaormeria de la colt, mica alimentara de cartier, studentul care isi deschide firma de IT — si o atitudine in privinta saraciilor si a celor defavoriti de ‘ajuta-i sa se ajute,’ atitudine motivata de ‘increderea in romanul de rand, roman pe care PSD il considera prost.’

Rolul populismului antreprenorial, la nivel retoric, este de a crea o punte intre neoliberalismul elitist si omul de rand, si, in acelasi timp, sa contracareze populismul daunator al PSD. Concret, in parlament PNL trebuie sa isi asume ‘deregulation’ pana la capat, public si necrutator. Si trebuie sa il motiveze prin faptul ca toata lumea pierde cand miciile afaceri pierd, ca lumea ramane fara locuri de munca fara un sector privat puternic, si ca birocratia si reguliile idioata in economie sufoca oportunitatea ceea ce i-ar putea ridica pe romani din saracie. Mai mult, PNL trebuie sa explice cum reglementariile in economie ii tin pe romanii saraci in economia subterana, adica fara pensie la batranete, fara asigurare medicala si fara o experienta legitima de munca cu care acestia sa acceada intr-o ierarhie profesionala. In sfarsit, PNL sa lipeasca pe fruntea populistiilor din PSD eticheta de oameni care ii considera pe romani prosti si incapabil. PNL ar putea indeplini acest obiectiv ridicand PSD urmatoarea intrebare: ‘oare ii considerati pe romani atat de prosti si incapabili de a isi castiga propria existenta incat considerati necesara pomana de la stat?’ Iar candidatul PNL trebuie sa continue cam asa: ‘noi, PNL, nu oferim pomeni; noi avem incredere in romanul de rand sa se descuce si sa isi castige propria paine. Noi ii vom oferi acestuia oportunitatea sa munceasca bine si sa pastreze rodul muncii — noi vom oferi investitii in scoli si in afaceri incat fiecare om sa prospere prin el insusi.’ Astfel, PNL poate asmuti mandria votantului de rand impotriva candidatiilor de stanga.

A treia tema, nu este o tema propriuzisa, dar o perceptie generala formata asupra mai multor teme precum educatie sau sanatate. Crin si PNL trebuie sa se prezinta ca cei ce aduc solutii inovatoare care, intr-un mod simplu de inteles, nu numai ca imbunatatesc calitatea serviciilor din educatie si sanatate, dar care ofera consumatorului mai multe optiuni si ii economisesc acestuia timp. De exemplu, cand educatia apare ca o tema de dezbatere, PNL ar trebui sa introduca o lege competitoare celei puterii, care introduce ’school vouchers.’ La fel ar putea sa faca si pe tema sanatatii. O sa explic astfel de modele de legi in alte articole.

Temele pe care tocmai ce le-am descris servesc in conturarea identitatii PNL ca un partid moderat, insa mai liberal ca PD-L si autentic de dreapta, dar care nu ignora paturiile sarace si electoratul de stanga. Adica, prin asumarea acestei identitati se incearca plasarea relativa a celorlalte partid vis-a-vis de PNL ca inautentice: PD-L ca partid fara ideologie si nu ca exponent al dreptei adevarate, PSD ca partid care doar se preface ca reprezinta interesul celor saraci si in schimb ii foloseste cinic si condescendent. In posturi viitoare voi explica cum sa fie asumate aceste teme prin actiunea politica.

In rest, ma pregatesc de un nou si eventual mai greu semestru la universitate. O sa am cursuri mai multe si probabil, unele mai grele. Oricum, nu imi plang de mila, doar  traim bine. Si cu asta promit ca e ultima gluma pe seama sloganului lui Base.

Dincolo de creativitatea debitata mai sus, vreau sa multumesc tuturor cititoriilor. Este ‘awesome’ sa stiu ca sunt oameni care vin in fiecare zi sa imi citeasca gandurile — chiar si cand le acceseaza prin telepatie ca atunci cand eram in sesiune. In special, as vrea sa multumesc tuturor celora care m-au incurajat, adaugat la blogroll si sustinut in orice fel. Va sunt tuturor recunoscator. Din nou, sa traiti bine.

Inainte sa postez linkurile pentru materialele mai sus mentionate va recomand doua carti citite tot la acest curs: Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution si Kapitalizm: Russia’s Struggle To Free Its Economy. Inspirat de Kapitalizm si de unele din materialele de mai jos am scris despre tranzitia de la economia planificata la cea de piata in posturiile: Kapitalizm — Partea I si Kapitalizm — Partea II. Fara sa o mai lungesc, lectura placuta:

• Fragment din The Russians de politologul si jurnalistul New York Times Hedrick Smith despre viata pe blat si coruptia din epoca Breznev din Rusia. Acesta este un fragment plin de umor si fascinant. Un must read pentru cine vrea sa inteleaga mai apoi fenomenele economice ale tranzitiei. Click.
• Majoritatea eseului The Power of the Powerless de Vaclav Havel despre cum regimele totalitariene incearca sa isi mentina puterea si cum incercarea lor de a impune minciuna ca realitate le submineaza eventual puterea. Click
• Un capitol din History of the Present de istoricul Timothy Garton Ash despre realitatiile politice imediat dupa prabusirea comunismului. un MUST MUST READ. Click.
• Eseul academic Advantages of Radical Reform care explica avantajele terapiei soc. Click.
• Transitions from Post-Communism de Michael McFaul despre preconditiile necesare pentru ca revolutiile coloarate sa se intample. Click.

P.S.

Pentru cei ce asteapta partea a doua din ‘Crin Spre Cotroceni — Editia 2014′ nu va speriati. Vine azi dupa cum am promis ieri.